Markets have long been recognized as an often astonishingly e¢ cient means of allocating resources. In 1993 Congress granted the FCC authority to design and run auction markets for the assignment of spectrum licenses. The FCC …rst began holding auctions for spectrum licenses in 1994, and ultimately developed the simultaneous multiple round auction based on substantial input from economists within the FCC and in academia. This basic auction format, with various modi…cations and extensions, continues to be used today. Since 1994, the FCC has held more than 80 auctions, has issued more than 36,000 licenses, and has raised more than $50 billion for the United States Treasury. 1 The program has been viewed as a great success and has been emulated around the world.
In this paper, we review the existing literature and provide new results. We show that the problem of designing an incentive auction is fundamentally di¤erent from the problem of designing a standard auction. We highlight six key ways in which a two-sided incentive auction di¤ers from the standard one-sided auction.
1. E¢ cient two-sided mechanisms do not generate positive revenue. In a two-sided market, in order to guarantee that goods are reassigned to the highest-valuing users, the market designer must be willing to take a loss. An intuition for this result comes from considering bargaining between one buyer and one seller. The buyer has an incentive to call out a low price and the seller has an incentive to call out a high price, so even when trade "should"happen, it is possible for negotiations to fail if the buyer's bid is below the seller's ask. A market maker is required to accept a negative spread in order to facilitate the transaction. 2 In contrast, in a standard one-sided auction environment, an ascending-bid auction with no reserve price is e¢ cient and generates positive revenue.
2. The revenue-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ is steeper in an incentive auction. Generating maximal revenue from an incentive auction has a higher opportunity cost in terms of lost e¢ ciency than in a standard auction, i.e., to maximize revenue, the market designer must give up more in terms of the market's ability to assign licenses to the highest valuing users. Although the legislation authorizing incentive auctions does not require that the FCC raise a minimum amount of revenue or that it maximize proceeds from the auction, statements made by both members of Congress and FCC Commissioners reveal that substantial revenue is expected from the auction. To the extent that current thinking is grounded in the revenue-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ present in the traditional one-sided spectrum license auctions, parties may not fully appreciate the consequences of their demands on the incentive auction.
3. The simultaneous auction of government-held spectrum along with the incentive auction may o¤er bene…ts. In designing the incentive auction, the FCC has the option of adding additional spectrum licenses to the supply in the market, which can potentially soften the trade-o¤ between revenue and e¢ ciency. In particular, a combined market design can lead to e¢ cient assignments while still generating positive revenue.
4.
Traditional arguments for open market designs are less clear in the case of the incentive auction. The e¤ects of the information revealed through an open mar-ket design, such as an ascending-bid auction, are more nuanced in an incentive auction than standard auctions. In a standard auction where bidders have interrelated values for the objects being sold, bidders lower their bids in order to avoid the "winner's curse." Open designs provide information to bidders that leads to more aggressive bidding and higher revenue. However, in an incentive auction releasing information may either increase or decrease expected revenue (e.g., positive information might increase bids by both buyers and sellers, but revenue, which is related to the gap between those bids might increase or decrease), so the argument is less clear. A key argument for a closed market design, such as a sealed-bid auction, is robustness to collusion. In an incentive auction, one must consider the additional possibility of coordination between buyers and sellers, but whether an incentive auction is more or less susceptible to collusion remains an open question.
5.
Increased complexity may have lower bene…ts and higher costs in an incentive auction. More complex auction designs can allow bidders more ‡exibility to address substitutability and complementarity among licenses. However, in an incentive auction, achieving the optimal matching of buyers and sellers may be more important than the role of substitutes and complements. The optimal trading network can be quite intricate and a single omitted bid can lead to a substantial change in the network of trades. In addition, a major concern in the design of the incentive auction is whether potential bidders are able to understand the auction and whether bidders will act as intended by the designer. Such concerns may be heightened in two-sided settings where complementarities between buyers and sellers and uncertainty over available supply may lead to greater complexity in analyzing potential bids and developing optimal strategies.
6. The exclusion of strong buyers can have more severe consequences in an incentive auction. An incentive auction can be more sensitive to the exclusion of a strong buyer than a standard auction. The impact on auction outcomes is more pronounced if the excluded buyer is stronger or if there are fewer total buyers. In addition, in an incentive auction, a reduction in the amount of spectrum transacted has broader implications because it means that less spectrum will be reassign from broadcaster to providers of mobile wireless services and could potentially a¤ect the repacking of the remaining broadcast licenses.
The FCC's original spectrum license auctions were novel, with design choices that were guided by insights from the economics literature (and economists) of the time. The FCC's incentive auction design will again necessarily be novel. As with the design of the initial auctions, the design of the FCC's incentive auction will rely on intuitions gained from the economics literature. Because some of the key tradeo¤s di¤er between the two environments, one must be careful in using intuitions gained from standard auctions in the design of the incentive auction. As was the case with the initial spectrum license auctions, the e¤orts spurred by the incentive auctions will spur new economic research that ultimately in ‡uences practice around the world.
